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Abstract 
 
Purpose –This study investigates the role of ICT in modulating the effect of governance on 
insurance penetration in 42 sub-Saharan African countries using data for the period 2004-
2014. 
 
 
Design/methodology/approach –Two insurance indicators are used in the analysis, namely: 
life insurance and non-life insurance. The three ICT modulating dynamics employed include: 
mobile phone penetration, internet penetration and fixed broadband subscriptions. Six 
governance channels are also considered, namely: political stability, “voice & accountability”, 
regulation quality, government effectiveness, the rule of law and corruption-control. The 
empirical evidence is based on generalized method of moments. 
 
 
Findings –The following main findings are established. First, mobile phone penetration does 
not significantly modulate governance channels to positively affect life insurance while it 
effectively complements “voice & accountability” to induce a positive net effect on non-life 
insurance.  Second, internet penetration complements: (i) governance dynamics of political 
stability, government effectiveness and rule of law to induce positive net effects on life 
insurance: and (ii) corruption-control for an overall positive effect on non-life insurance. 
Third, the relevance of fixed broadband subscriptions in promoting life insurance is apparent 
via governance channels of regulation quality, government effectiveness and the rule of law 
while fixed broadband subscriptions do not induce significant overall net effects on non-life 
insurance though the conditional effects are overwhelmingly significant. 
 
 
Orginality/value – To the best our knowledge, studies on the relevance of ICT in promoting 
insurance consumption through governance channels are sparse, especially for a region such 
as sub-Saharan Africa where insurance penetration is low compared to other regions of the 
world.  
 
 
JEL Classification: G20; I28; I30; L96; O55  
Keywords: Africa; ICT; Governance; Insurance 
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1. Introduction 
The insurance market is very relevant in the sustainable development of a country because it 
offers opportunities of risk mitigation by enabling people to hedge risks and reduces negative 
extenalities of disasters and macroeonomic shocks on household welfare and economic 
activities. Moreover, insurers play an intermediary role by mobilizing aggregate domestic 
capital and transforming it into long-term investments. This role of intermediation has 
positive ramifications on the development of financial markets and economic prosperity. 
Against this background, there are three main motivational factors underpinning the 
positioning of this study on the relevance of information and communication technology 
(ICT) in moderating the effect of governance on insurance penetration in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), notably: the low penetration of insurance in the sub-region, the importance of ICT in 
development outcomes and gaps in the literature. These three motivational elements are 
expanded in the following passages.  
 First, compared to other regions of the world, the insurance market in SSA is very 
small. Kyerematen (2015) maintains that in the African continent, with the exception of South 
Africa, only approximately 5% citizens in the continent subscribe to insurance services. 
According to the narrative, the underlying low penetration is traceable to difficiencies in a 
number of factors, inter alia: low financial access and absence of infrastructure. This research 
focuses on how burgeoning ICT infrastructure can be leveraged to promote insurance in the 
light of the high potential for ICT penetration in SSA.  
 Second, an important body of economic development literature has been recently 
focusing on the importance of ICT in development outcomes within and across developing 
countries. The attendant literature is consistent on the position that information technology 
can be leveraged to improve inter alia: agricultural productivity, corporate performance, 
equitable income distribution, financial access and health facilities. The corresponding 
contemporary studies supporting this perspective on the importance of ICT include: Penard, 
Poussing, Yebe and Ella (2012), Asongu (2013),  Tchamyou (2017), Afutu-Kotey, Gough and 
Owusu (2017), Asongu and Nwachukwu (2018a, 2018b), Abor, Amidu and Issahaku (2018), 
Gosavi(2018), Asongu and Boateng(2018), MinkouaNzie, Bidogeza and Ngum (2018), 
Humbani and Wiese (2018), Isszhaku, Abu and Nkegbe (2018) and (Asongu & Odhiambo, 
2019a). Inspite of the growing literature on the importance of information technology in 
socio-economic development, the role of information technology and insurance development 
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in SSA is scarce in contemporary African development literature. Hence, the positioning of 
this study builds on an apparent gap in the insurance literature.   
 Third, as expanded in section 2, extant contemporary studies on the development of 
the insurance sector in Africa has focused on two main strands, namely: linkages between 
insurance development and economic prosperity (Ioncică, Petrescu, Ioncicaand 
Constantinescu, 2012; Akinlo, 2015; Chang and Lee, 2012;  Chen, Lee and Lee, 2012; Lee 
Lee and Chiu, 2013a; Lee, Huang and Yin, 2013b; Guerineau and Sawadogo, 2015; 
Sawadogo,Guérineau and Ouedraogo, 2018; Alhassan and Biekpe, 2015, 2016a) and 
determinants of insurance development (Guerineau and Sawadogo, 2015; Alhassan an 
Biekpe, 2016b; Zerriaa, Amiri, Noubbigh and Naoui, 2017). The present research is closer to 
the second strand on drivers of insurance penetration and extends both strands by engaging 
governance channels via which ICT promotes insurance penetration in SSA. In essence, this 
research argues that contrary to the engaged literature which is based on linkages between 
insurance development and macroeconomic outcomes, it is more policy-relevant to go a step 
further by providing policy makers with policy channels through which policy moderating 
variables (i.e. ICT dynamics in the case of this study) affect insurance penetration. The 
governance channels used in this study are motivated both by the: (i) need to fill a gap in the 
literature and (ii) documented importance of good governance in promoting economic 
development in Africa (Efobi, 2015; Asongu and Kodila-Tedika, 2016;Ajide and Raheem, 
2016a, 2016b). 
 In the light of the above, the research question this study aims to answer is the 
following: how does ICT modulate the effect of governance on insurance penetration in SSA? 
In order to make this assessment, the study focuses on 42 sub-Saharan African countries using 
data for the period 2004-2014.The empirical evidence is based on generalized method of 
moments.The following main findings are established. First, mobile phone penetration does 
not significantly modulate governance channels to positively affect life insurance while it 
effectively complements “voice & accountability” to induce a positive net effect on non-life 
insurance.  Second, internet penetration complements: (i) governance dynamics of political 
stability, government effectiveness and rule of law to induce positive net effects on life 
insurance: and (ii) corruption-control for an overall positive effect on non-life insurance. 
Third, the relevance of fixed broadband subscriptions in promoting life insurance is apparent 
via governance channels of regulation quality, government effectiveness and the rule of law 
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while fixed broadband subscriptions do not induce significant overall net effects on non-life 
insurance though the conditional effects are overwhelmingly significant. 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. The intuition for the empirical analysis 
and attendant literature are discussed in section 2 while section 3 presents the data and 
methodology. Section 4 discloses and discusses the empirical results before the research 
concludes in section 5 with implications and future research directions.  
  
2. Intuition and literature review 
This section is discussed in two main sub-sections. The first focuses on the intuition 
motivating the positioning of the study while the second expands the highlighted literature in 
the introduction on which the positioning of the study is based.  
 
2.1 Intuition  
For every policy or phenomenon to affect a macroeconomic outcome, the governance 
climate (political, economic and institutional) of the country has to be favourable. Hence, 
there is a fundamental intuition for the association between good governance and 
development outcomes. Such outcomes can be socio-economic (e.g. poverty alleviation, 
reduction in inequality...etc), financial (e.g. access to finance) and security against risks (e.g. 
insurance), inter alia.  
In the first section, this research is cognizant of the risks involved in engaging an 
empirical analysis without an established theoretical underpinning. However, the study posits 
that applied econometrics is not used exclusively for the acceptance and rejection of existing 
theories. Hence, an applied economics study based on sound intuiton is a useful scientific 
activity that could provide the basis for theory-building, especially in the light of connections 
between ICT, governance and insurance. It follows that the positioning of this study is 
consistent with an evolving stream of literature on the importance of empirical studies that are 
motivated by logic and intuition (Costantini and Lupi, 2005; Narayan, Mishra and Narayan, 
2011; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016a). In what follows, the relationships between ICT, 
governance and insurance are substantiated.  
ICT has been documented to improve political, economic and institutional dimensions 
of good governance in Africa (Asongu, le Roux, Nwachukwu and Pyke, 2019a). Hence, there 
is an underpinning assumption that ICT modulates political (“political stability and “voice & 
accountability”), economic (government effectiveness and regulation quality), institutional 
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(rule of law and corruption-control) dimensions of governance. The conceptions and 
definitions of these governance dynamics are in accordance with contemporary literature:  
“The first concept is about the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced 
(Political Governance): voice and accountability and political stability. The second has to do 
with the capacity of government to formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services 
(Economic Governance): regulatory quality and government effectiveness. The last, but by no 
means least, regards the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the 
interactions among them (Institutional Governance): rule of law and control of corruption” 
(Andres, Asongu and Amavilah, 2015, p. 1041). Governnace provides enabling conditions for 
insurance development because policy makers are aware of benefits of insurance penetration 
in economic development, especially in the promotion of a conduicive investment climate and 
sustainable economic prosperity (Kumari, 2016). The intuition for the role of ICT in 
modulating governance for development outcomes is broadly consistent with the literature on 
innovating existing networks and institutions with information technology to influence social 
change, entreneurship and economic development (Pittaway, Robertson, Munir, Denyer, and 
Neely, 2014; Centobelli, Cerchione, Esposito and Shashi, 2019; Shashi, Centobelli, Cerchione 
and Singh, 2019; Lashitew, van Tulder, and Liasse, 2019; Asongu, Orim and Nting, 2019b).  
  
2.2 Literaure review on insurance  
 In the second section, building on the narrative in the introduction, the extant 
contemporary literature on insurance penetration has principally focused on two main strands, 
notably, on: drivers of insurance penetration (Guerineau and Sawadogo, 2015; Alhassan and 
Biekpe, 2016b; Zerriaa et al., 2017) and nexuses between insurance and economic 
development outcomes (Ioncică et al., 2012; Akinlo, 2015; Alhassan and Biekpe, 2015, 
2016a). The two strands are expanded in the following passages.  
With regard to the strand on drivers of insurance consumption, focusing on 20 
countries with data for the period 1996-2011, Guerineau and Sawadogo (2015), after 
accounting for the concern of endogeneity with the help of an endogeneity-robust empirical 
strategy, have concluded on a positive nexus between life insurance consumption and per 
capita income. Furthermore, the penetration of life insurance is negatively associated with life 
expectancy and the young dependency ratio while features that are positively linked with life 
insurance include: old dependency ratio, government stability and property rights.  
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 Determinants of life insurance have been assessed by Zerriaa et al. (2017) using data 
from 1990-2014. The findings show that interest and inflation rates do not have significant 
impacts on the dependent variable. Moreover, the demand for life insurance is reduced by 
pension expenditure whereas features that promote negative impacts are: urbanization, 
financial development, income, dependency and life expectancy.  
 Alhassan and Biekpe (2016b) have investigated factors promoting life insurance in 31 
countries in Africa using data from 1996 to 2010. The findings reveal that compared to 
financial drivers, demographic features are more worthwhile in elucidating life insurance. 
Moreover, life insurance is also reduced by life expectancy, inflation and dependency whereas 
positive effects are apparent from insurance consumption, health expenditure, financial 
development and institutional quality.  
 In the second strand, Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) assess linkages between economies 
of scale, efficiency and productivity in the non-life insurance market in South Africa with data 
from 2007 to 2012. The empirical evidence is based on logistic, bootstrapped and “data 
envelopment analysis” regressions. The findings reveal that about one-fifth of insurers 
perform their operations in an optimal manner while non-life insurers are linked with about 
50% of inefficiency. The corresponding findings show that ameliorations in productivity 
depend on technological improvements and the non-linear incidence of size on efficiency and 
constant returns to scale. According to the conclusions of the study, leverage, product line 
diversification and reinsurance have considerable linkages with efficiency and constant 
returns to scale.  
 Akinlo (2015) has investigated causal nexuses between insurance and economic 
growth in 33 countries in SSA for the period 1995-2011. Using panel data with an estimation 
approach that accounts for heterogeneity, the results show evidence of bidirectional causality 
between economic growth and insurance penetration. In another study, Alhassan and Biekpe 
(2016a) have examined the relationship beteen insurance penetration and economic 
development in Africa. The study focuses on a selected number of countries (Algeria, Gabon, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa) using data for the period 
1990-2010. The empirical evidence is based on autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) and 
vector error correction model (VECM) regressions.  From the ARDL findings, there is a long 
term relationship between economic growth and insurance development in Kenya, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. As for the VECM findings: (i) mixed causality is 
apparent in Gabon; (ii) unidirectional causality is found in Algeria and Madagascar and (iii) 
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bidirectly causality is established in Morroco. The positioning of this research in the light of 
the engaged studies has been discussed in the introduction.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
The focus of this study is on forty-two nations in SSA with data for the period 2004-20142. 
The choice of the sampled countries and corresponding periodicity of analysis are determined 
by constraints in data availability at the time of the study. The variables used in the research 
are obtained from three main sources, notably: (i) World Governance Indicators of the World 
Bank for the governance indicators (i.e. political stability, “voice & accountability”, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality, corruption-control and the rule of law); (ii) 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank for ICT indicators (i.e. mobile phone 
penetration, internet penetration and fixed broadband subscriptions) and a control variable 
(i.e. tertiary school enrolment) and (iii) the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD) of the World Bank for the insurance dynamics (i.e. life insurance and non-life 
insurance).   
 In the light of the above, the choice of the governance indicators is consistent with 
recent African governance literature (Oluwatobi, Efobi, Olurinola, Alege, 2015; Andrés et al., 
2015; Ajide and Raheem, 2016a, 2016b; Asongu, le Roux, Nwachukwu and Pyke, 2019). The 
adopted insurance variables are also in line with the attendant literature highlighted in the 
introduction and expanded in section 2. Moreover, we have engaged all the insurance 
indicators available in the FDSD of the World Bank. Hence, no concerns of data omission 
bias are apparent. As for the ICT variables, in accordance with contemporary literature on the 
relevance of engaging more technology indicators in order to provide more room for policy 
implications (Efobi, Tanaken and Asongu, 2018; Tchamyou, Erreygers and Cassimon, 2019), 
the three ICT indictors disclosed in the preceeding paragraph are used.  
 Before discussing the estimation strategy, it is important to articulate why only one 
control variable (i.e. tertiary school enrolment) is used in the empirical exercise. The objective 
of limiting elements in the conditioning information set to one variable is motivated by the 
                                                          
2The 42 countries include: “Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia”.  
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need to limit instrument proliferation even when the collapse option is used in the estimation 
exercise. Accordingly, in the generalised method of moments (GMM) regressions, the 
employment of limited control variables is acceptable provided that the purpose for  doingso 
is to avoid the proliferation of instruments that can substantially bias estimated coefficients 
(Bruno, De BonisandSilvestrini, 2012). Drawing on the attendant literature, there are studies 
that have used no control variable as in this research, notably: Osabuohien and Efobi (2013) 
and Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017). The definitions and sources of variables are provided in 
Appendix 1, whereas the summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2. The correlation 
matrix is covered by Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 GMM Specification 
       Building on contemporary literature using the GMM regression technique (Asongu and 
Nwachuwku, 2016a; Asonguand Odhiambo, 2019b; Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Tchamyou et 
al., 2019), four main motivations underpin the choice of the estimation strategy. These 
motivational elements are expanded in the following passages. First, an elementary condition 
for the choice of the estimation approach is that the number of agents (i.e. N) should exceed 
the number of periods (i.e. T) that each agent is characterised with. Hence, the N>T condition 
for the employment of this estimation technique is fulfilled because the research is dealing 
with 42 countries for the period 2004-2014 (i.e. 11 years).  Second, persistence is apparent in 
the outcome variables because both have correlation coefficients between the level and first 
lag values that are higher than the established threshold of 0.800 (Meniago and Asongu, 2018; 
Tchamyou et al., 2019). In essence, the corresponding correlations for life insurance and non-
life insurance are respectively,   0.992 and 0.975. Thrid, in the light of the panel nature of the 
datastructure, cross-country differences are factored into the estimations. Fourth, the concern 
of endogeneity is addressed from a dual perspective: (i) reverse causality or simultaneity is 
tackled with a process of instrumentation and (ii) the unobserved heteorogeniety is addressed 
by controlling for time invariant omitted variables.  
              Among available GMM options in the empirical literature (i.e. difference versus 
system estimators), this research is in accordance with recent studies in adopting the Roodman 
(2009a, 2009b) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) which has been documented to 
produce more efficient estimates, partly because it controls for cross-sectional dependence 
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and mitigates the proliferation of instruments (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016b; Boateng, 
Asongu, Akamavi and Tchamyou, 2018). 
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiI , denotes an insurance indicator (i.e. life insurance and non-life insurance) of country 
i in  period t , 0 is a constant. T is an ICT indicator (i.e. mobile phone penetration, internet 
penetration and fixed broadband subscriptions) of country i
 
in  period t . E
 
is tertiary 
educationof country i in  period t . G denotes a governance dynamic (i.e. political stability, 
“voice & accountability”, regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption-control 
and the rule of law) of  country i in  period t . TG
 
reflects interactions between ICT  and 
governance indicators(“mobile phone penetration” × “political stability”; “mobile phone 
penetration” × “voice & accountability”; “mobile phone penetration”× “regulation quality”; 
“mobile phone penetration” × “ government effectiveness”; “mobile phone penetration” × 
“corruption control”; “mobile phone penetration”× “the rule of law ”;“internet penetration” × 
“political stability”; “internet penetration” × “voice & accountability”; “internet penetration”× 
“regulation quality”; “internet  penetration” × “ government effectiveness”; “internet 
penetration” × “corruption control”; “internet penetration”× “the rule of law ”;“fixed 
broadband subscriptions” × “political stability”; “fixed broadband subscriptions” × “voice & 
accountability”; “fixed broadband subscriptions”× “regulation quality”; “fixed broadband 
subscriptions” × “ government effectiveness”; “fixed broadband subscriptions” × “corruption 
control” and “fixed broadband subscriptions”× “the rule of law ”).  represents the coefficient 
of auto-regression which is one within the framework of this study because a year lag is 
enough to capture past information, t
 
is the time-specific constant, i
 
is the country-specific 
effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 
3.2.2Identification and exclusion restrictions 
It is worthwile to susbantiatethe GMM specification with attendant identification and 
exclusion restrictions because they are indispensible for a robust GMM specification. In 
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accordance with contemporary empirical literature on the subject, years are identified as 
strictly exogenous whereas elements in the conditioning information set (i.e. tertiary school 
enrolment) and the independent variables of interest (i.e. governance and ICT dynamics) are 
considered as endogenous explaining or predetermined variables (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 
2016c; Tchamyou and Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018; Tchamyou et al., 2019). Roodman 
(2009b) is sympathetic to this strategy of identification because he has argued that it is not 
feasible for years (i.e. identified as strictly exogenous) to be endogenous after a first 
difference3.   
            In the light of the identification strategy covered in the preceding section, the 
exclusion restriction assumption is examined with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) 
whichis used to assess the exogeneity of instruments.  The null hypothesis of the DHT 
maintains that the acknowledged strictly exogenous variables affect the insurance dynamics 
exclusively through the predetermined variables and elements in the conditioning information 
set.   
         Cognizant of the clarifications provided above, in the findings that are reported in the 
following section, the alternative hypothesis of the DHT should not be accepted in order for 
the assumptions underpinng the identification and exclusions narrative to hold. Such 
assumptions are consistent with less contemporary specifications (i.e. in instrumental variable 
regressions) where-by the rejection of the alternative hypothesis of the Sargan/Hansen test is 
warranted for the identified instruments or strictly exogenous variables to affect the outcome 
variable exclusively through the exogenous components of the predetermined variables (see 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2003; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016d). 
 
4. Empirical results  
Results of the empirical analysis are disclosed in this section in Tables 1-6. Table 1 shows 
findings on life insurance, governance and mobile phone penetration while Table 2 shows 
results on non-life insurance, governance and mobile phone penetration.It is important to note 
that governance entails all the six governance dynamics employed in the study, namely: 
political stability, “voice & accountability”, regulation quality, government effectiveness, the 
rule of law and corruption-control. Hence, aspects of political governance (i.e. the first-two 
governance variables), economic governance (i.e. the third and the fourth governance 
                                                          
3Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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variables) and institutional governance (i.e. the last-two governance variables) are taken on 
board.  
The regressions in Table  3 pertain to nexuses between governance, internet penetration and 
life insurance whereas those in Table 4 are related to linkages between governance, internet 
penetrarion and non-life insurance. In Table 5, connections between governance, fixed 
broadband subscriptions and life insurance are apparent while in Table 6, the results disclosed 
are related to governance, fixed broadband subscriptions and non-life insurance. Each table 
has six main specifications that are respectively associated with each of the governance 
dynamics, notably: political stability, “voice & accountability”, regulation quality, governance 
effectiveness, rule of law and corruption control (i.e. in this order). For every specification, 
four main information criteria are employed to assess the validity of estimated models4. Based 
on these criteria, the estimated models are overwhelmingly valid.  
              In the light of the attendant information criteria, first and foremost, it is apparent 
from the findings that the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test in difference 
confirms the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals because of the failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Second, the Hansen test is given priority over the Sargan test 
because it is more robust. It is worthwhile to articulate that the Sargan test is not robust but 
not weakened by instrument proliferation while the Hansen test is robust but weakened by the 
proliferation of instruments. In order to avoid conflicts in these information criteria, while the 
Hansen test is given prioritiy, instrument proliferation is avoided by ensuring that for every 
specification, the number of instruments is lower than the corresponding number of countries. 
Third, as clarified in the previous section, the DHT is used to assess the validity of the 
exclusion restrictions assumption, notably: that the identified strictly exogenous variables 
influence the outcome variables exclusively through the independent variables.  Fourth, a 
Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients overwhelmingly confirms the 
validity of estimated models.  
 
“Insert Tables 1-6” 
                                                          
4
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu and De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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            In order to assess the overall relevance of ICT in the role of governance on insurance 
penetration, net effects are computed as in recent literature based on interactive regressions 
(AsonguandOdhiambo, 2019c; Agoba et al., 2019).For example, in the third column of Table 
2, the net effect from the relevance of mobile phone penetration in moderating the effect of  
“voice & accountability” on non-life insurance is 0.0172 ([-0.0007 × 45.330] + [0.049]). In 
the computation, the average value of mobile phone penetration 45.330, the unconditional 
effect of “voice & accountability” is 0.049while the conditional or interaction effect between 
“voice & accountability” and mobile phone penetration is -0.0007. The same computational 
procedure is followed for the remaining tables with mean values of internet penetration and 
fixed broadband subscriptions being respectively, 7.676 and 0.643.  
              The following findings can be established. No net effects are apparent in Table 1 
because at least one of the estimated coefficients relevant for the computation of net effects is 
not significant. Accordingly, if the unconditional effect of governance dynamic or the 
conditional effect (i.e. from the interaction between a governance dynamic and mobile phone 
penetration) is insignificant, a net effect cannot be feasibly computed.  In Table 2, mobile 
phone penetration effectively complements “voice & accountability” to induce a positive net 
effect on non-life insurance. In Table 3, internet penetration complements the following 
governance dynamics to induce positive net effects on life insurance: political stability, 
government effectiveness and rule of law. In Table 4, internet penetration effectively 
complements corruption-control for an overall positive effect on non-life insurance.  
The relevance of fixed broadband subscriptions in promoting life insurance is apparent 
via governance channels of regulation quality, government effectiveness and the rule of law in 
Table 5. In Table 6  whilefixed broadband subscriptions do not significantly induce overall 
net effects on non-life insurance penetration via governance mechanisms, the corresponding 
conditional or interactive effects are positive which is further indicative of the fact that 
increasing fixed  broadband subscriptions to certain thresholds can ultimately induce overall 
positive net effects. The control variable is largely siginificant with the expected sign because 
university graduates are more educated on the importance of insurance in security, risk 
mitigation and economic development.  
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5. Concluding implications, limitations and future research directions 
This study investigates the role of ICT in modulating the effect of governance on insurance 
penetration in 42 sub-Saharan African countries using data for the period 2004-2014. Two 
insurance indicators are used in the analysis, namely: life insurance and non-life insurance. 
The three ICT modulating dynamics employed include: mobile phone penetration, internet 
penetration and fixed broadband subscriptions. Six governance channels are also considered, 
namely: political stability, “voice & accountability”, regulation quality, government 
effectiveness, the rule of law and corruption-control. The empirical evidence is based on 
generalized method of moments. 
 The following main findings are established. First, mobile phone penetration does not 
significantly modulate governance channels to positively affect life insurance while it 
effectively complements “voice & accountability” to induce a positive net effect on non-life 
insurance.  Second, internet penetration complements: (i) governance dynamics of political 
stability, government effectiveness and rule of law to induce positive net effects on life 
insurance: and (ii) corruption-control for an overall positive effect on non-life insurance. 
Third, the relevance of fixed broadband subscriptions in promoting life insurance is apparent 
via governance channels of regulation quality, government effectiveness and the rule of law 
while fixed broadband subscriptions do not induce overall net effects on non-life insurance 
though the conditional effects are overwhelmingly positive. As a main policy implication, 
ICT is an important policy tool that can be used to promote insurance consumption in SSA via 
governance channels.  
 
Managerial and policy implications 
 In the light of the findings, enhancing information technology in sub-Saharan Africa 
will go a long way to increasing the consumption of both life insurance and non-life insurance 
in the sub-region. However, the positive incidence of ICT in effectively moderating 
governance for insurance consumption is contingent on specific governance and ICT 
dynamics. Among the considered ICT tools, fixed broadband subscribtions are most 
instrumental, followed by internet penetration and mobile phone penetration (in this order). 
Moreover, in the light of the overwhelming positive conditional effects in the regressions 
pertaining to fixed broadband subscriptions and non-life insurance, enhancingfixed broadband 
subscriptions will substantially promote life insurance. Such enhancement is feasible given 
the comparatively low penetration rate of fixed broadband subscriptions compared to other 
15 
 
ICT dynamics. The comparative importance of fixed broadband subscriptions relative to other 
ICT tools is consistent with recent ICT literature (Efobi et al., 2018).  
 
Limitations  
 There are two main limitations in the study. On the one hand, the findings apply to a 
sample of countries and not to country-specific cases, partly because country-specific effects 
are eliminated from the generalised method of moments modelling in order to avoid potential 
concerns of endogeneity pertaining to the correlation between the lagged dependent variable 
and country-specific effects. On the other hand, the governance measurements are perception-
based indicators which may be subject to biases. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, 
the World Governance Indicators from the World Bank used in this study are the 
mostemployed in the literature (Pelizzo and Nwokora, 2016, 2018; Pelizzo, Araral, Pak and 
Xun, 2016; Asongu and Nnanna, 2019).  
 
Future research directions  
 Sub-Saharan Africa also has a comparative advantage in the enhancement of ICT 
because compared to other regions of the world; it is the sub-region with the lowest rate of 
ICT penetration (Tchamyou et al., 2019). It will therefore be worthwhile for future studies to 
be positioned on how ICT penetration can be increased in Africa in order to achieve targeted 
effects on socio-economic development outcomes such as the consumption of life insurance. 
Moreover, considering other policy instruments by which insurance penetration can be 
increased via governance channels is alsoa worthwhile future research direction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
Table 1: Life insurance, governance and mobile phone penetration  
       
 Dependent variable: Life Insurance 
       
Life Insurance (-1) 0.932*** 0.962*** 0.950*** 0.930*** 0.918 0.937*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phone (Mobile) 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 
 (0.718) (0.776) (0.788) (0.837) (0.355) (0.739) 
Political Stability (PolS) 0.020 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.392)      
Voice & Accountability (VA) 
--- -0.023 --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.441)     
Regulation Quality (RQ) 
--- --- 0.055 --- --- --- 
 
  (0.282)    
Government Effectiveness(GE) 
--- --- --- 0.032 --- --- 
 
   (0.551)   
Rule of Law (RL) 
--- --- --- --- 0.033 --- 
 
    (0.291)  
Corruption-Control (CC) 
--- --- --- --- --- 0.004 
 
     (0.931) 
Mobile × PolS 
-0.0001 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.439)      
Mobile × VA 
--- -0.0001 --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.462)     
Mobile × RQ 
--- --- -0.0006 --- --- --- 
 
  (0.203)    
Mobile × GE 
--- --- --- -0.0007* --- --- 
 
   (0.063)   
Mobile × RL 
--- --- --- --- 0.00007 --- 
 
    (0.714)  
Mobile × CC 
--- --- --- --- --- -0.0005* 
 
     (0.078) 
Tertiary Education  
-0.021 0.042 -0.008 0.017 -0.024 0.049 
 (0.832) (0.677) (0.946) (0.837) (0.777) (0.688) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  na na na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.306) (0.295) (0.289) (0.300) (0.294) (0.298) 
AR(2) (0.357) (0.344) (0.346) (0.356) (0.355) (0.353) 
Sargan OIR (0.088) (0.217) (0.096) (0.198) (0.072) (0.062) 
Hansen OIR (0.762) (0.621) (0.644) (0.560) (0.714) (0.232) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.058) (0.034) (0.105) (0.031) (0.060) (0.040) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.995) (0.988) (0.895) (0.973) (0.984) (0.576) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.126) (0.107) (0.115) (0.096) (0.084) (0.056) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.951) (0.873) (0.881) (0.835) (0.963) (0.508) 
Fisher  17319*** 2973.18*** 2891.47*** 4513.46*** 6120.05*** 10385.83*** 
Instruments  28 28 28 28 28 28 
Countries  33 33 33 33 33 33 
Observations  158 158 158 158 158 158 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. 
45.330, 7.676 and 0.643 are respectively mean values of mobile phone penetration, internet penetration and fixed broadband subscriptions. na: not applicable 
because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions. PolS: Political 
Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law.  
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Table 2: Non-Life insurance, governance and mobile phone penetration  
       
 Dependent variable: Non-Life Insurance 
       
Non-Life Insurance (-1) 0.993*** 0.861*** 0.950*** 0.850*** 0.918*** 0.937*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phone (Mobile) 0.0003 -0.00007 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0001 
 (0.286) (0.837) (0.788) (0.167) (0.355) (0.739) 
Political Stability (PolS) 0.034 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.118)      
Voice & Accountability (VA) 
--- 0.049** --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.037)     
Regulation Quality (RQ) 
--- --- 0.055 --- --- --- 
 
  (0.282)    
Government Effectiveness(GE) 
--- --- --- 0.049 --- --- 
 
   (0.109)   
Rule of Law (RL) 
--- --- --- --- 0.033 --- 
 
    (0.291)  
Corruption-Control (CC) 
--- --- --- --- --- 0.004 
 
     (0.931) 
Mobile × PolS 
-0.0003* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.067)      
Mobile × VA 
--- -0.0007*** --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.006)     
Mobile × RQ 
--- --- -0.0006 --- --- --- 
 
  (0.203)    
Mobile × GE 
--- --- --- -0.0007*** --- --- 
 
   (0.004)   
Mobile × RL 
--- --- --- --- 0.00007 --- 
 
    (0.714)  
Mobile × CC 
--- --- --- --- --- -0.0005* 
 
     (0.078) 
Tertiary Education  
-0.098* 0.092 -0.008 0.130* -0.024 0.049 
 (0.063) (0.922) (0.946) (0.090) (0.777) (0.688) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  na 0.0172 na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.018) (0.020) (0.289) (0.021) (0.294) (0.298) 
AR(2) (0.970) (0.880) (0.346) (0.832) (0.355) (0.353) 
Sargan OIR (0.012) (0.005) (0.096) (0.006) (0.072) (0.062) 
Hansen OIR (0.353) (0.283) (0.644) (0.145) (0.714) (0.232) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.421) (0.112) (0.105) (0.040) (0.060) (0.040) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.318) (0.458) (0.895) (0.395) (0.984) (0.576) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.096) (0.081) (0.115) (0.002) (0.084) (0.056) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.591) (0.520) (0.881) (0.954) (0.963) (0.508) 
Fisher  718.35*** 1064.53*** 2891.47*** 691.25*** 6120.05*** 10385.83*** 
Instruments  28 28 28 28 28 28 
Countries  35 35 35 35 35 33 
Observations  168 168 168 158 158 158 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. 
45.330 is the mean value of mobile phone penetration. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is 
not significant. Constants are included in the regressions. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation 
Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law.    
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Table 3: Life insurance, governance and internet penetration  
       
 Dependent variable: Life Insurance 
       
Life Insurance (-1) 0.915*** 0.917*** 0.884*** 0.872*** 0.877*** 0.908*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet 
-0.001 -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.003** 
 (0.162) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
Political Stability (PolS) 0.026* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.064)      
Voice & Accountability (VA) 
--- 0.029 --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.335)     
Regulation Quality (RQ) 
--- --- 0.018 --- --- --- 
 
  (0.788)    
Government Effectiveness(GE) 
--- --- --- 0.135** --- --- 
 
   (0.013)   
Rule of Law (RL) 
--- --- --- --- 0.078*** --- 
 
    (0.009)  
Corruption-Control (CC) 
--- --- --- --- --- 0.076** 
 
     (0.024) 
Internet × PolS 0.004*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Internet × VA 
--- 0.005*** --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.000)     
Internet × RQ 
--- --- 0.010*** --- --- --- 
 
  (0.000)    
Internet × GE 
--- --- --- 0.004*** --- --- 
 
   (0.000)   
Internet × RL 
--- --- --- --- 0.005*** --- 
 
    (0.000)  
Internet × CC 
--- --- --- --- --- -0.0008 
 
     (0.493) 
Tertiary Education  
-0.056 0.197** 0.328*** 0.139** 0.069 0.056 
 (0.342) (0.011) (0.002) (0.015) (0.209) (0.444) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  0.0567 na na 0.1657 0.1163 na 
       
AR(1) (0.291) (0.288) (0.290) (0.282) (0.300) (0.297) 
AR(2) (0.363) (0.386) (0.404) (0.395) (0.367) (0.363) 
Sargan OIR (0.632) (0.491) (0.424) (0.679) (0.474) (0.182) 
Hansen OIR (0.646) (0.357) (0.259) (0.331) (0.812) (0.520) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.250) (0.195) (0.226) (0.042) (0.107) (0.056) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.744) (0.455) (0.306) (0.729) (0.984) (0.888) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.354) (0.356) (0.128) (0.216) (0.152) (0.156) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.672) (0.349) (0.399) (0.402) (0.962) (0.700) 
Fisher  8728.65*** 4887.86*** 6495.43*** 3811.19*** 4439.58*** 4390.30*** 
Instruments  28 28 28 28 28 28 
Countries  33 33 33 33 33 33 
Observations  158 158 158 158 158 158 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. 
7.676 is the average internet penetration rate. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not 
significant. Constants are included in the regressions. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation 
Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law.  
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Table 4: Non-Life insurance, governance and internet penetration  
       
 Dependent variable: Non-Life Insurance 
       
Non-Life Insurance (-1) 0.840*** 0.749*** 0.825*** 0.813*** 0.812*** 0.846*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet 
-0.005*** -0.009*** -0.003 -0.003* -0.006*** -0.004** 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.011) (0.078) (0.001) (0.011) 
Political Stability (PolS) 0.015 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.426)      
Voice & Accountability (VA) 
--- 0.056 --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.233)     
Regulation Quality (RQ) 
--- --- -0.019 --- --- --- 
 
  (0.529)    
Government Effectiveness(GE) 
--- --- --- 0.050 --- --- 
 
   (0.112)   
Rule of Law (RL) 
--- --- --- --- 0.058* --- 
 
    (0.052)  
Corruption-Control (CC) 
--- --- --- --- --- 0.045* 
 
     (0.093) 
Internet × PolS 
-0.001 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.190)      
Internet × VA 
--- 0.001 --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.181)     
Internet × RQ 
--- --- 0.0004 --- --- --- 
 
  (0.727)    
Internet × GE 
--- --- --- -0.003** --- --- 
 
   (0.049)   
Internet × RL 
--- --- --- --- 0.0005 --- 
 
    (0.631)  
Internet × CC 
--- --- --- --- --- -0.002** 
 
     (0.033) 
Tertiary Education  0.213*** 0.278** 0.196*** 0.138* 0.155** 0.170* 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.087) (0.038) (0.051) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  na na na na na 0.0296 
       
AR(1) (0.015) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) (0.021) (0.020) 
AR(2) (0.818) (0.747) (0.704) (0.888) (0.850) (0.812) 
Sargan OIR (0.007) (0.085) (0.012) (0.025) (0.007) (0.030) 
Hansen OIR (0.177) (0.357) (0.566) (0.158) (0.469) (0.253) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.500) (0.252) (0.628) (0.378) (0.540) (0.377) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.132) (0.407) (0.468) (0.136) (0.396) (0.230) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.418) (0.197) (0.079) (0.165) (0.350) (0.376) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.146) (0.452) (0.873) (0.215) (0.475) (0.231) 
Fisher  876.36*** 252.16*** 1767.21*** 1213.81*** 977.80*** 1633.71*** 
Instruments  28 28 28 28 28 28 
Countries  35 35 35 35 35 35 
Observations  167 167 167 167 167 167 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. 
7.676 is the mean values of internet penetration. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not 
significant. Constants are included in the regressions. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation 
Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law.  
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Table 5: Life insurance, governance and fixed broadband subscriptions  
       
 Dependent variable: Life Insurance 
       
Life Insurance (-1) 0.907*** 0.939*** 0.786*** 0.879*** 0.861*** 0.952*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed BroadBand (BroadBand) 0.046*** -0.003 -0.120*** -0.115*** -0.052** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.859) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.001) 
Political Stability (PolS) 0.116*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.009)      
Voice & Accountability (VA) 
--- 0.007 --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.853)     
Regulation Quality (RQ) 
--- --- 0.320*** --- --- --- 
 
  (0.000)    
Government Effectiveness(GE) 
--- --- --- 0.216* --- --- 
 
   (0.090)   
Rule of Law (RL) 
--- --- --- --- 0.182*** --- 
 
    (0.000)  
Corruption-Control (CC) 
--- --- --- --- --- 0.086 
 
     (0.196) 
BroadBand × PolS 
-0.016 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.317)      
BroadBand × VA 
--- 0.030 --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.131)     
BroadBand × RQ 
--- --- 0.133*** --- --- --- 
 
  (0.000)    
BroadBand × GE 
--- --- --- 0.141*** --- --- 
 
   (0.000)   
BroadBand × RL 
--- --- --- --- 0.070*** --- 
 
    (0.005)  
BroadBand × CC 
--- --- --- --- --- 0.009 
 
     (0.475) 
Tertiary Education  
-0.220*** 0.001 0.504*** 0.134* 0.137 -0.166*** 
 (0.000) (0.985) (0.000) (0.092) (0.176) (0.007) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  na na 0.4055 0.3066 0.2270 na 
       
AR(1) (0.288) (0.294) (0.266) (0.273) (0.275) (0.296) 
AR(2) (0.334) (0.357) (0.384) (0.363) (0.362) (0.366) 
Sargan OIR (0.093) (0.019) (0.185) (0.209) (0.030) (0.002) 
Hansen OIR (0.750) (0.241) (0.320) (0.621) (0.701) (0.622) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.174) (0.250) (0.069) (0.043) (0.238) (0.080) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.906) (0.270) (0.610) (0.975) (0.810) (0.915) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.265) (0.134) (0.234) (0.064) (0.396) (0.108) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.841) (0.364) (0.375) (0.941) (0.711) (0.872) 
Fisher  33787.31*** 34883.80*** 11032.76*** 57162.64*** 23352.36*** 8824.49*** 
Instruments  28 28 28 28 28 28 
Countries  33 33 33 33 33 33 
Observations  142 142 142 142 142 142 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. 
0.643is the  mean value of fixed broadband subscriptions. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects 
is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law.  
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Table 6: Non-Life insurance, governance and fixed broadband subscriptions  
       
 Dependent variable: Non-Life Insurance 
       
Non-Life Insurance (-1) 0.976*** 0.791*** 0.839*** 0.907*** 0.847*** 0.914*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed BroadBand (BroadBand) 
-0.015 -0.104*** -0.078*** -0.059*** -0.088*** -0.007* 
 (0.185) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) 
Political Stability (PolS) 
 0.059*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.002)      
Voice & Accountability (VA) 
--- 0.022 --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.470)     
Regulation Quality (RQ) 
--- --- 0.020 --- --- --- 
 
  (0.623)    
Government Effectiveness(GE) 
--- --- --- -0.007 --- --- 
 
   (0.788)   
Rule of Law (RL) 
--- --- --- --- -0.029 --- 
 
    (0.441)  
Corruption-Control (CC) 
--- --- --- --- --- 0.024 
 
     (0.394) 
BroadBand × PolS 0.002 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.825)      
BroadBand × VA 
--- 0.093*** --- --- --- --- 
 
 (0.000)     
BroadBand × RQ 
--- --- 0.063*** --- --- --- 
 
  (0.000)    
BroadBand × GE 
--- --- --- 0.050*** --- --- 
 
   (0.000)   
BroadBand × RL 
--- --- --- --- 0.085*** --- 
 
    (0.000)  
BroadBand × CC 
--- --- --- --- --- -0.002 
 
     (0.825) 
Tertiary Education  0.016 0.387*** 0.386*** 0.218*** 0.358*** 0.063*** 
 (0.478) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
       
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Net Effects  na na na na na na 
       
AR(1) (0.036) (0.036) (0.020) (0.029) (0.034) (0.046) 
AR(2) (0.783) (0.404) (0.294) (0.595) (0.823) (0.933) 
Sargan OIR (0.036) (0.160) (0.069) (0.005) (0.082) (0.020) 
Hansen OIR (0.168) (0.581) (0.299) (0.214) (0.176) (0.178) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.338) (0.104) (0.110) (0.069) (0.033) (0.457) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.156) (0.841) (0.484) (0.436) (0.499) (0.140) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.125) (0.226) (0.250) (0.454) (0.126) (0.143) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.265) (0.692) (0.339) (0.173) (0.275) (0.262) 
Fisher  492548.67*** 54467.02*** 9319.74*** 7008.05*** 177030.10*** 3570.30*** 
Instruments  28 28 28 28 28 28 
Countries  34 34 34 34 34 34 
Observations  148 148 148 148 148 148 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: 
Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. 
0.643 is the  mean value of fixed broadband subscriptions.na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed  for the computation of net effects 
is not significant. Constants are included in the regressions. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
Life Insurance  LifeIns Life Insurance Premium Volume to GDP (%) FDSD 
    
Non-Life Insurance  NonLifeIns Non-life Insurance Premium Volume to GDP (%) FDSD 
    
Mobile Phones  Mobile  Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Internet  Internet  Internet users (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Fixed Broad Band BroadB Fixed broadband subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Political Stability  PolS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): 
measured as the perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilised or overthrown 
by unconstitutional and violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism” 
WDI 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a 
free media” 
 
WDI 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies”. 
 
 
WDI 
    
 
Regulation Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development”. 
 
WDI 
    
 
Corruption-Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites 
and private interests” 
 
WDI 
    
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
 
 
 
WDI 
    
Tertiary School TSE School enrollment, tertiary (gross), gender parity index 
(GPI) 
WDI 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators of the World Bank. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database of the World Bank.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2004-2014) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Life Insurance  0.881 2.126 0.0006 12.220 346 
Non-Life Insurance  0.798 0.536 0.005 2.774 367 
Mobile Phone Penetration 45.330 37.282 0.209 171.375 558 
Internet Penetration 7.676 10.153 0.031 54.26 453 
Fixed Broad Band 0.643 1.969 0.000 14.569 369 
Political Stability  -0.471 0.905 -2.687 1.182 462 
Voice & Accountability -0.509 0.683 -1.780 0.970 462 
Government Effectiveness -0.711 0.599 -1.867 1.035 462 
Regulation Quality -0.608 0.529 -1.879 1.123 462 
Corruption-Control -0.577 0.590 -1.513 1.139 462 
Rule of Law -0.651 0.604 -1.816 1.007 462 
Tertiary School Enrollment 0.775 0.437 0.064 3.295 293 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 3:Correlation matrix (uniformsample size : 152) 
             
Mobile  Internet BroadB PolS VA GE RQ CC RL TSE LifeIns Non 
LifeIns 
 
1.000 0.734 0.590 0.315 0.381 0.381 0.369 0.331 0.347 0.553 0.285 0.178 Mobile 
 1.000 0.799 0.363 0.465 0.552 0.461 0.497 0.533 0.775 0.286 0.360 Internet 
  1.000 0.407 0.436 0.577 0.513 0.470 0.526 0.672 0.404 0.283 BroadB 
   1.000 0.796 0.724 0.707 0.763 0.769 0.443 0.390 0.505 PolS 
    1.000 0.790 0.810 0.734 0.837 0.401 0.412 0.477 VA 
     1.000 0.899 0.876 0.933 0.542 0.516 0.498 GE 
      1.000 0.793 0.880 0.400 0.573 0.462 RQ 
       1.000 0.891 0.582 0.444 0.525 CC 
        1.000 0.518 0.533 0.584 RL 
         1.000 0.324 0.404 TSE 
          1.000 0.648 LifeIns 
           1.000 NonLife
Ins 
             
Mobile: Mobile phone penetration. Internet: Internet penetration. BroadB: Fixed  broad band subscriptions. PolS: Political 
Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. 
RL: Rule of Law. TSE: Tertiary School Enrolment. LifeIns: Life Insurance. NonLifeIns. 
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